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BOOK REVIEWS
By Charles Rembar. New York: Random House.
1968. Pp. 528. $8.95.

THE END OF OBSCENTY.

Not many war stories by trial lawyers are worth nine dollars, but this one
is an exception. It is a sensitive, lucid description of the judicial struggles of two
notorious literary ladies (Lady Chatterley and Fanny Hill) and a cryptic restroom wall (Tropic of Cancer). The author is the lawyer who represented the
publishers of all three books. But The End of Obscenity is more than a set of
war stories - which is probably why it's worth nine dollars. It is also the limited
autobiography of a provocative and interesting man, and the didactic tour de
force of a frustrated school teacher. Anyone can read it, and most people should.
I. A Story of Three Books
A. Lady Chatterley. When the first of these cases, a post-office administrative action against Lady Chatterley's Lover, came to hearing, the nineteenth
century Hicklin1 rule had worked its way through Butler v. Michigan2 and Roth
v. United States' with surprisingly little loss of weight. The Constitution still
appeared to permit the suppression of literature which tended "to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences." 4 The limitations imposed by Butler made an adult population appropriate, and Roth required that the book - if a book was at issue - be considered as a whole, whatever that meant.5
Mr. Rembar, a former government lawyer engaged (it appears) in copyright work, was employed to represent the publisher. He had never tried a case;
he apparently claimed no special expertise on the law of free speech. He set
out to demonstrate that the Roth "test" protected serious writing from suppression. Some eight years and many courtrooms later, in the Supreme Court of
the United States, his generalization became the law. "So far as writers are
concerned, there is no longer a law of obscenity."
The idea that social value could be a defense to prosecution -that "well
written obscenity" was a contradiction in terms -was
a novel and lonely argument in 1959. It rested on an ambiguous piece of dicta from Justice Brennan's
Roth opinion - "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."' The statement
did not say that literature otherwise within the Hicklin test is redeemed by its
social importance; at least it didn't say that until Mr. Rembar interpreted it.
The Brennan dicta appeared in an opinion written to affirm convictions
under both state and federal obscenity statutes. To get his point out of Roth
1 Queen v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360. The Hicklin court based its test of obscenity
upon "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall." Id. at 371.
2 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
3 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4 The statement is quoted at C. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY 20 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Text].

5
6

Text 15-26.
354 U.S. at 484.
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and to do it in courts required to adhere to the Supreme Court's version of
the law - Mr. Rembar had to extract from "an opinion woven largely of
dubious history and non sequiturs" one helpful "thread of solid meaning." His
reasoning: (1) The Supreme Court says that the justification of obscenity laws
is that the material suppressed is "utterly without redeeming social importance."
(2) Writing which contains social importance - and, as it came out, Mr.
Rembar never insisted that this meant any social importance at all - is not
within this justification. (3) Therefore socially important literature is protected
by the First Amendment.
Mr. Rembar says that he felt "entitled to urge that the [Roth] opinion
be given a free translation," and he did, and it worked, but not until some of
his allies - the American Book Publishers Council, for example - had rejected
his argument as not tenable. (The Council's bulletin, as late as 1963, implied
that the social-importance test was relevant only as to material which was not
otherwise obscene.')
Mr. Rembar was astute enough to assemble more protection than social
value for Constance Chatterley. He also argued that the "prurient interest"
formula instituted in Roth meant something other than normal interest -a
good point for Constance and Mellors, of course, because their mutual attraction seemed to be biologically (if not socially) normal. (The argument conceded
that D. H. Lawrence meant to appeal to normal sexual interest, but that would
have been the finding anyway.) Mr. Rembar then combined his tests and
contended that only literature falling within both categories (i.e., literature
which was both without social significance and enticing to abnormal sexual
interest) could be suppressed.9 That set a tough hurdle for the Post Office
Department. The hearing officer referred the case to the Postmaster General;
Mr. Rembar, whose client could afford no more delay, sought a federal injunction. The Postmaster General announced his decision against the book the
day suit was filed, which made a sort of judicial review out of the injunction
action. Mr. Rembar won the case in the federal courts - district and circuit.10
The Solicitor General declined to appeal further; there were no state prosecutions. In comparison with Mr. Rembar's two later adventures, it was an easy
win, but his social value test was not prominent in the opinions of the second
circuit. The court had taken his invitation to find for the book on the ground
that it was not prurient, but even in that holding it is not clear that the court
agreed with a distinction between appeal to sexual interest (not prurient) and
appeal to something baser (prurient).
B. Tropic. The Tropic of Cancer cases were state prosecutions; the Post
Office and federal prosecutors left the book alone - partly, perhaps, because
-

7 Text 475:

I argued that our case did not involve any "scintilla theory of value." . . . My guess
was that the Supreme Court, following our law's empirical inclination to deal with
one case at a time, would not pause to meditate on how to handle a suppositious
work of admittedly meager quality.
8 Text 57-58.
9 He reduces this to a lovely little drawing. Text 126.
10 Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd 276 F.2d
433 (2d Cir. 1960). Mr. Rembar also describes and criticizes the Lady Chatterley trial in
England. Text 152-60.
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of the precedent Mr. Rembar helped to set in Lady Chatterley. This situation
threatened fifty times fifty prosecutions. It was aggravated when Mr. Rembar's
client was forced by business considerations to publish an almost simultaneous
paperback edition of Miller's curious novel 1 and to maintain for its wholesale
purchasers the customary agreement to defend obscenity suits. Mr. Rembar
had to limit his client's vulnerability, to avoid if he could the devastating effect
of "censorship by multiplicity of litigation." (Prosecutors, as he points out, profit
by this sort of harassment even when they lose every case.)
He worked from the publisher's home office in New York, with a model
brief for use in each local prosecution. On the law, Mr. Rembar's Lady Chatterley strategy would soon have become mired in Henry Miller's scatology. (Mr.
Rembar, still loyal to his principle if not to the book itself, never clearly admits
how much Miller's prose revolts him.) He could not make the argument that
"prurient interest" referred to base perversion, because Miller's work did appeal
to base perversion. That was the difference between Tropic of Cancer and
Lady Chatterley. (She may not have been a lady in the American sense, but
at least she was healthy.) Mr. Rembar had to rely solely on his social value argument. There was no obscenity, he said, in writing about shameful, morbid things,
if only the writer avoided a shameful, morbid means of doing it. The proposition was that worthwhile prose - regardless of what it was about - could not
be obscene.
The argument failed in the trial court in Boston; Mr. Rembar took charge
of the appeal in the Supreme Judicial Court. His secondary line of attack was
based on an idea suggested by Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Roth 2 - that
the seriousness of the publisher is a factor in deciding obscenity. (Mr. Rembar
seems to have sensed the importance of the "pandering" consideration long
before the rest of us. He seems to have been unsurprised at the Court's opinion
in Ginzburg v. United States.")
Even assuming that the Supreme Judicial Court would accept the socialvalue test (which it did), Mr. Rembar had another tactical problem. Unless
the case went on to the Federal Supreme Court, the decision would not foreclose local prosecutions in other states - and, as a matter of fact, prosecutions
were underway in California, Wisconsin, Indiana, Florida, Pennsylvania, and
several other states, at the time he argued Tropic in Massachusetts. On the other
hand, he did not want to go into the Supreme Court a loser. The ideal result
was a Massachusetts opinion in favor of the book, expressly accepting the socialvalue test, but predicated solely on federal constitutional grounds. That imposing,
illusive result is exactly what he got; but in a denouement that must prove something about best laid plans, the Attorney General of Massachusetts declined to
11 He explains that another publishing house put out a paperback edition of Tropic
based on an old text, as his client's hard-cover edition was published. This forced a paperback version of the new edition much sooner than business considerations would otherwise
have required. Text 170.
12 354 U.S. at 494. This was able scholarship and it allowed Mr. Rembar to make a
record on his publisher's reputation and seriousness. It later proved crucial when Fanny Hill
was briefed and argued in the Supreme Court with Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966), and Mishkin v. New York 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
13 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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appeal- 4 Decisions in other states, against the book, were only theoretically
appealable; none was in the posture the Massachusetts case had been. In a
three-judge federal injunction action in New Jersey, for example, Mr. Rembar's
client lost, 5 but there was every possibility that the Supreme Court, if it took
an appeal, would decide the case on a narrow jurisdictional ground. Victories
for the book in California and Wisconsin did not go to the Supreme Court,
although each gave some support to the social-value theory. 6
The final Supreme Court ruling on Tropic was anticlimactic. The Court,
in Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein" reversed conviction per curiam. The lowercourt judgment was from an intermediate Florida court in which the federal
questions had been eliminated at the pleading stage. The justices of the Supreme
Court incorporated their confusing welter of opinions from the French movie
case, Jacobellis v. Ohio." Social value was recognized in Jacobellis by two
members of the Court, but two is not a majority of nine. Gerstein was bound
to disappoint a general like Mr. Rembar. It had not been briefed nor argued;
there was no real record before the Court, and "not even an opinion the book
could call its own." It was a victory only, not a moral victory.
C. Fanny Hill. Fanny was even more vulnerable than Tropic had been.
Fanny, like Lady Chatterley, was normally (sexually) enticing, and was therefore outside the tradition which vindicated Ulysses. 9 ("Judge Woolsey concluded his famous opinion [in Ulysses] by disapproving the aphrodisiac and
approving the emetic." ' ) On the other hand, Fanny was classical pornography,
much more so than Tropic had been; anybody who knew about it at all knew
that it was a dirty book. Virtually no critic had written about it seriously; it
was not regarded as literature, and the most widely circulated edition of it had
been bowdlerized in reverse- made more pornographic in language and decorated with risque drawings. (Mr. Rembar's client was not responsible for this
edition.)
Fanny's publisher had not agreed to indemnify booksellers, as Tropic's had.
Mr. Rembar, who advised the publisher from the first, decided against widespread initial sale. The book (an accurate, unillustrated, hard-cover edition)
was marketed in three key states (New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey) and
all three prosecuted it; his plan was to defend vigorously on a limited front.
Federal authorities did not proceed against the book.
The Massachusetts proceeding was a libel"' against the book; the New
14 Mr. Rembar gives a characteristically courtly explanation for this, at Text 194-95; it
turned on the young Attorney General's preoccupation with a primary contest for the Democratic nomination for the Senate.
15 Grove Press, Inc. v. Calissi, 208 F.Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1962).
16 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152 (1963); McCauley v. Tropic
of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 '(1963).
17 378 U.S. 577 (1964).
18 378 U.S. 184 (1964); see also O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court:
A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NoTR DAME LAWYER 1 (1964).
19 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821), had involved
an early edition of FANNY, but was not otherwise relevant to the modern case.
20 Text 223.
21 Mr. Rembar points out that the folklore which regards actions against books as more
dangerous than actions against people is overly theoretical. He displays a fine appreciation
for the human insight that a jail cell is worse than a bonfire.
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York and New Jersey cases were criminal prosecutions. Mr. Rembar appealed
in Massachusetts and handled the trials in the other states, with the widest possible array of data - reviews, expert testimony, erudite argument with skilled
opponents. Largely as a result of the suits, the literary community began to
produce opinions on the social value of Fanny. (Mr. Rembar calls that "bootstrap justice.") His description of the trials is fascinating, but the trials themselves were probably magnificent. He won in New York. and New Jersey but
lost in Massachusetts.22 He took the Massachusetts loss to the Supreme Court,
argued it with Ginzburg and Mishkin, and there finally, definitively, vindicated
his social-value theory2 It is a tribute to Mr. Rembar's skill that even his
opponents, in the last round, accepted the theory. With social value accepted
as part of the nation's constitutional law, 4 obscenity had, at least for serious
writers, come to an end.2
II. Limited Autobiography
There is just enough of a modest variant on the My Life in Court theme
in this book to make a reviewer wish there were more. Mr. Rembar is a man
I would like to know better, and his war stories are stories I would like to hear
more about. He manages, in a finally charming way, to let his personality show
through here and there; my only criticism is that he hid himself behind his
professional self-image as much as he did.
He has been good for his clients in the ultimate way of a wise counsellor.
The campaign to establish social value as a constitutional limitation on censorship is a permanent victory for serious book publishers and writers. It cost his
two publisher clients an immense amount of time and money, of course, but it
proved a better thing for them - and for literature too - than smaller, cheaper
victories would have. The book has many tactical examples of this personal
concern for an ultimate victory. It is nice to know a lawyer who thinks that way;
not all of us do.
22

Attorney General v. A Book, 345 Mass. 11, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965); G. P. Putnam's

Sons v. Calissi, 50 N.J. 397, 235 A.2d 893 (1967); People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192
N.E.2d 713 (1963).
23 A Book v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Mr. Rembar argued in his Supreme
Court brief that good writing, even in the law, was rare enough to deserve constitutional
protection; he cited the brief for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as an example of the
rare good legal writing he was talking about.
24 Mr. Rembar counts five justices who accept the social-value test from the variety of
essays in the three cases. Six voted to reverse in Fanny Hill, A Book v. Attorney General, 383
U.S. 413 (1966). Justices Brennan and Fortas and Chief Justice Warren accepted the test
in the Court's principal opinion '(by Justice Brennan); Justice Stewart accepted the theory
in a separate opinion. Justice Harlan, finally, accepted the test but would have applied it
only to federal convictions. Since no other member of the Court accepts Justice Harlan's
distinction between state and federal cases, Mr. Rembar feels justified in counting his vote
in favor of the test. If counting Justice Harlan is too optimistic, Mr. Rembar believes that
Justice Douglas would accept the test. The reader may want to track Mr. Rembar's reasoning, at Text 480-81, and also consult his table at id. 513.
25 Text 490:
Assuming he can produce something not "utterly without" merit, which is equivalent to assuming that he is a writer at all, he and his book will be safe. If he has
some talent, and if he is making any effort to use that talent- whatever springs
and urges may have put him (or John Cleland) to work -the law will never bother
him.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February, 1969]

Mr. Rembar is an astute, alert lawyer. Examples of that are sometimes
merely meticulous - e.g., the motion he made in the federal district court
(in Lady Chatterley) to have his client's name appear first in the caption; that
assured valuable publicity and brought a laugh from Judge Bryan. Some of
the examples are incisive: He was careful to argue from Aquinas for the Catholic
members of the New York Court of Appeals, and to talk about the Seven Deadly
Sins in Massachusetts. He was willing, in the Fanny Hill trial, to let the judge
consider isolated passages from the novel, if care was taken to keep the isolated
passages from appearing, severed, in the record. He came into each of these
cases without having read the books involved and, with the possible exception
of Tropic, became personally convinced that the principles of free speech ought
to extend to them. (His personal opinion of the books, which is not always
dear, is irrelevant only in law.) One practical test of his ability as a lawyer is,
perhaps, that he manages to attract his clients by first beating them when he
represents somebody else. "I believe it was meant to be not a tribute to skill
but a description of unremitting truculence," he says of that, but it is a truculence which brings small victories out of apparent defeats. In the Lady Chatterley hearing, for instance, Post Office counsel suggested that Constance was
a tramp; Mr. Rembar defended the lady's honor; the hearing officer said he
thought it made no difference whether Constance was a tramp (which, if the
book alone were considered, was of course true). Mr. Rembar finished the
dialogue by suggesting that it did make a difference because the assertion by
the Post Office demonstrated a tyrannical attitude in favor of sexual purity in
literature.
There are times, though, when I wonder if his devotion to the objective
is as thorough as he makes it seem. At several interesting points he demonstrates that he was touched by the anxiety of witnesses (poets, critics, and other
victims of the law). In one example, he decided not to use a lady witness because, he says, the case did not need her. ("I would not have been considerate
of her feelings if we had needed another witness.") Mr. Rembar admits that
he watched another nervous witness with concern, but claims that he was solicitous only for the case, not for the witness. I wondered when I read this last
if he protested too much. He may have more feeling-I think he does than he is willing to admit. There is a sort of folklore about the trial bar which
says it is bad tactics to care about people. In C. P. Snow's Conscience of the
Rich, the young barrister who is its central figure decides that he will never
succeed as a trial lawyer because he finds the witness before him more interesting than the point he is trying to prove. Mr. Rembar is at great pains to prove
that he is not that kind of lawyer. But I wonder why human concern would be
such a serious blight on his competence. I attribute Snow's episode to a subtle
cynicism about lawyers, but I am tempted to attribute Mr. Rembar's to a distorted self image that is more professional than human. Mr. Rembar is more
like Snow's lawyer than he thinks.
Mr. Rembar manages, in any event, to retain a fine sense of objectivity
after the cases are over. (That is an important quality in a lawyer; it assures
that our profession will work for sound reform in the law rather than for legis-
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lation which will benefit regular clients.) He displays a fine sense for the malaise
which must descend on the sensitive judge in an obscenity case - nausea born
of the impossible burden of being a public flower arranger for hypocritical moral
standards, ethical insight, and literary taste. He agrees with Judge Desmond,
for example, that the humor in Tropic is not very funny.26 He is careful to
defend the honor and objectivity of his fellow lawyers, and of the bench. He
recognizes that people like Ginzburg and Mishkin are anti-social, and that the
social-value test brings with it a certain at least temporary amount of harm:
The current uses of the new freedom are not all to the good. There
is an acne on our culture. Books enter the best-seller lists distinguished only
by the fact that once they would have put their publishers in jail. Advertising plays upon concupiscence in ways that range from foolish to fraudulent. ... A visitor from outer space who had time to study only our art
and entertainment would take back.an eccentric view of the reproductive
process on earth.
But it will pass. It will pass because it is not the freedom itself, but
the taboo it displaces, that sets the stage for prurience ... The truest definition of pornography requires that the act of reading itself be sinful, or
illegal, or authority-defying, or at least sneaky. . . .The long refusal to
permit honest treatment of sexual subjects has conditioned a nation of

voyeurs.
Our black-magic view of sex suffers from illumination, and we must
benefit from its discomfiture 2 7
He believes that the oft-heard argument that obscenity is not socially harmful is overworked and inaccurate."' The first amendment, he says, assumes that
some speech will be harmful; freedom of speech does not need the defense that
it is harnless. He also believes there is a difference between the ordinary aesthetic
response to art and sexual response to pornography. "It is as though, to create
the emotion of fear, a working model of a tiger were brought into the room,"
he says of pornography. He disagrees, finally, with the tactical posture taken
by the American Civil Liberties Union in Ginzburg, which attempted to translate the "clear and present danger" test from political cases to literary cases.
(His reason for this disagreement is coldly pragmatic, however. "Whatever might
be said for or against such a result was, to my mind, irrelevant: the Court was
not nearly ready for it.")
Mr. Rembar fields some stimulating ideas that are not confined to his
subject or to his law practice. He believes, for example, that just cases should
not be settled; I find that idea challenging, particularly since'I tell my students
(in wills and trusts) that one of the fundamental principles of law practice is
to avoid litigation (a lesson I learned from good lawyers in a large law firm).
Mr. Rembar admits that the cost of litigation is too great to make practical the
26 See APPENDIX.
27 Text, 491-93.
28 He believes, for instance, that Mishkin's produce is proof against the argument that
if Fanny Hill could not be banned, nothing could; and that Liaison would have failed the
"patently offensive" test.
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use of the courts as vindicators of principle. His answer is to have all lawyers
paid by the government. 9
III. Didactic Tour de Force
Mr. Rembar, like many of the successful lawyers I have known, is a frustrated teacher. He has the careful advocate's passion for explaining his references. He leaves no obscure legalism undefined, no judicial turn unstoned."
Sometimes these pedagogical asides are mini-lectures in themselves - his chapter
on Aspects of the Law is, for example, an exegesis on stare decisis and a useful
defense of historic jurisprudence."' He gives three or four short chapters to a
survey of the legal situation before and after the Roth case and they are as lucid
in explaining that complex subject as anything you're likely to find in ponderous
essays five times as long.
His pithy instruction is more often contained in asides or footnotes.8 2 He
illustrates dicta in appellate opinions by allusion to the Lord's explanation of
rights of inheritance among children - including sons - when the petitioners
included only Moses' daughters. He gives useful parenthetical definitions of
such things as inter-state rendition (when he relates his defense of Henry Miller
in a Brooklyn police court), the hearsay rule, 3 judicial notice ("a judge . ..
saying, sometimes rather absently, 'Yes, I know'"), and the protocol which
distinguishes "Justice" from "Mr. Justice."
Mr. Rembar puts legalistic pomp to the torch as well as any irreverent
academic can. The common "irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent" has its
source, he says, "in our deep fondness for trinities and the rhythms of magic."
The practice of making exceptions on the trial record "involves the assumption
that lawyers are made happy by adverse rulings" and the belief that "what the
judge has said somehow gains clarification if the lawyer says 'Exception.'"
Most of his instruction is serious and useful. (I would not again attempt
to teach a legal method course without prescribing, and maybe even requiring,

29 Another instance, and one I would enjoy discussing with Mr. Rembar, is the idea that
laws against profanity do not touch the first amendment because "a common use of it is the
insult hurled in a charged social situation." Mr. Rembar should have an opportunity to
relate that opinion to the streets of Chicago in August, 1968.
30 It is fair to warn the reader that his style warms the reader slowly. In the early pages
of the book he strains a bit to be witty and engages in footnote pedagogy that seems mildly
condescending- as for instance when he defines "lawyers" and "writers," in the style of the
Uniform Commercial Code, in his first chapter.
31 He defends stare decisis in terms of its protection against corruption, its fairness, its
orderliness and its practical utility.
32 See APPENDIX.
33 A lovely example of this last phenomenon, from the transcript of the Fanny Hill trial
in Boston, is recounted at Text 329-30 (the witness is Professor John Bullitt of the Harvard
English department) :
Q. (by Mr. Rembar) : You just mentioned, Mr. Bullitt, two characters who are quite
distinct in the book. Is there in general the treatment of character and the development of character in this book that is typical of the novel as a literary form?
A. Very much so. Perhaps the proper way to start answering your question is to

refer to a critical remark made by Henry Fielding in Tom JonesTHE COURT: No. You can't bring hearsay in here.
THE WITNESS: Sorry.
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that the students sit for a while at the feet of Professor Rembar.) He is well
read and thoughtful and objective enough to merit respect even when he is
talking about a subject on which he has been necessarily partisan. The use of
the ancient "deodands" concept in Justice Frankfurter's opinion on the New
York book-seizure statute, 4 for example, provokes two-and-a-half pages of disquisition which begins in Exodus and Aeschines and ends in a personal aside
on the doctrine of prior restraint in free-speech cases. Mr. Rembar feels the
doctrine is unrealistic.
He has had the time and the good sense to step back from his courtroom
battles and to assess them in terms of sound advocacy - always with modesty
for his own work, courtesy and respect for his fellow contenders, and admiration
for the lonely demands of the judicial office. ("It is just very difficult, in these
cases, for the judge to keep his eye, fixed and unwavering, on the law. Fanny
Hill is too beguiling, and Fanny Hill must suffer the consequences.")"5 He illustrates how it is that a clever advocate leaves testimonial episodes unclear and
uses the record in summation -when it is too late for the other side to identify
and correct its mistakes. He illustrates the folly in trying cases for the audience.
("[W]hile glibness is an aid to advocacy, the advocate must know, even better
than his audience, just how much of his discourse is no more than glib.") He
even manages to make fairly plausible his decision to argue extemporaneously
in the Supreme Court of the United States - in his first appearance there, by
the way.
At times, these didactic adventures take Mr. Rembar into judicial policy.
He believes, for instance, that the members of the Supreme Court honestly
attempt to agree on their decisions (and even on their opinions, which is something else). But, as he points out, "the only cases that reach the Court today
bring close questions with them." This is because predictable judicial results
ought to come out of the courts of appeal. It is also because the expense of an
appeal to Mt. Olympus is too great to be expected of most routine litigants in
more modest appellate courts. There are, he concludes, "more split decisions
than there used to be," but this "is no indication of flightiness."
He marvels, as all ordinary lawyers must, at the curious decisions of the
Solicitor General of the United States. In the Ginzburg case, for instance, counsel for the Government were convinced that the Supreme Court would not
affirm the five-year prison sentence which had been imposed in the Third Circuit. 6 The Government therefore invited a double decision from the Court,
which would have left intact the fine imposed (in effect) on Liaison - and
would therefore have vindicated the Comstock Law- but would have reversed
as to Eros and The Housewifes Handbook on Selective Promiscuity. "The fines
to be paid on Liaison may have been paltry in the light of the economics of the
whole enterprise, but it is not the Supreme Court's function to enlarge in34 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
35 Justice Black noted that he had not read Mishkin's and Ginzburg's publications, as
is his custom in obscenity cases. He did not, however, make the customary disclaimer as to
Fanny Hill. "Fanny does indeed inspire gallantry."
36 See notes 12 and 22 supra.
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adequate penalties." The Court, as it turned out, proved to be a more zealous
prosecutor than the Solicitor General.
Thomas L. Shaffer*
111
APPENDIX
A Sampler of the Wit and Wisdom
of Charles Rembar
(from The End of Obscenity)
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: "The Court is not a
legislature fulfilling the wishes of a current majority. It is a group of lawyers
reading a constitution that was meant to give a permanent pledge of certain
liberties, regardless of what the current majority would like. While in a measure
the Court is responsive to popular attitudes, it is at the core proof against them."

COMPARING THE JUDGES HAND:

"Augustus was the cousin of the more

famous, but not judicially abler, Learned Hand. The latter, whose opinions
contain some of the best prose America has produced, achieved enormous prestige as a judge which might more appropriately have been accorded him as a
writer and philosopher of the law. Learned Hand was extraordinarily creative,
but he was better at contributing ideas than at choosing between competing
ideas presented to him, and the primary function of a judge is to judge."
STARE DECIsIs: "[W]e know that last time thought and effort went into
the problem, and it seems a good idea to have the benefit of that thought and
effort now. The past has banked its wisdom, and it is foolish not to draw on it."
PRECEDENTS OVERRULED:

"The congressional anguish (and that of some

sections of the American Bar Association, for another respectable example) is
not in fact what it is said to be. There is no real mourning for stare decisis.
There is only a wail of frustration from those who do not like the Bill of Rights,
did not really know it was there, and would certainly have voted against it in
1787. The wailing is not for a lost principle, but for distasteful results."
ON CALLING ONE'S OPPOSING COUNSEL "BROTHER":

"This somewhat

archaic form of reference is still occasionally heard, and I favor it. Lawyers
are, of course, brethren at the bar. But if that fraternal notion is rejected by
the reader as patently unrealistic, the term remains appropriate: a lawyer may
properly call his opponent 'brother' in the sense that Hemingway's Old Man
called the fish he killed his brother."
COMMUNITY STANDARDS IN OBSCENITY CASES:

"[Tihe First Amendment

is a cheap thing if all it provides is the assurance that one may say what a current majority is willing to hear."
VICE AMONG THE POOR: "By concentrating on paperbacks, the censors
might create a condition in which the one third of the nation that was ill fed,
*

Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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ill housed and ill clothed would at the same time have its prurient interest insufficiently appealed to."
WELL WITTEN OBSCENITY: "It is not plausible that the coexistence of

freedom for trash and repression for good writing was a matter of chance. Express or implied, the understanding was that some publications for whose sale
the wholesaler might otherwise be prosecuted could safely be sold, if he stayed
away from others designated as critical. Famous underground books would
always be able to make the critical list. Newer, less celebrated books.that were
seriously written and seriously received were also vulnerable; nothing infuriates
the vigilante so much as the combination of sex and intellect."
HENRY MILLER'S HUMOR AND CLASSROOM WIT: "The comedy in the book
is essentially comic relief. The impulse to laugh comes principally from the
context in which the jokes are made. The atmosphere is very much like that
of the classroom. There is no response to humor so easily induced as that of the
cramped and aching students; given the circumstances, almost any change in
subject gives pleasure, and a little wit goes a long way."

ADVOCACY: "The litigating lawyer is a mercenary, one of the few remaining
examples of the hired combatant. His premise is hostility.... The rules observed,
the hostility is socially approved, indeed demanded.

"Almost all our occupations are competitive, of course, but in most callings
the battle is waged darkly and with guilt. The approved mode is constructive
cooperation, and reasonableness toward those with whom one deals. ...

The

courtroom lawyer, on the other hand, spends half his time exposing the fallacies
of his brother at the bar, an exercise in scorn and damage. If he is cordial, we
understand that it is only good manners."
ON THE BENCH: "'Bench'

is an outrageous misnomer; it is an imposing

seat of power. 'Throne' would be closer."
ON TLEVISION ADVOCATES: "Contemplating the effect of television courtroom drama on legal style, I have sometimes felt a chill at what must be happening to medical techniques."
OBsc NrY AND SOCIAL HARM: "Jimmy Walker's celebrated remark that
he had never heard of a girl who had been seduced by a book [was] a tribute
to the impermeable virtue of New York womanhood perhaps, but an insult to
literature."
EROS (THE MAGAZINE, NOT THE GOD): "It combined elements of Playboy, Captain Billy's Whiz Bang, and American Heritage, and suggested the
coffee table at least as much as the bed table."
JUSTICE STEWART'S TEST OF OBSCENITY:

"a Magic, Automatic Self-

Bailing Little Wonder."
ON THE RESULTS OF THE GnZBURG-MISHICN GASES: "It is quite clear
that the doom-sayers were wrong. It is also quite clear that the joy of the Citizens [for Decent Literature] was just whistling in the light."
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AFRICA AND LAW: DEVELOPING LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH

NATIONS. Edited by T. W. Hutchison and others. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1968. Pp. xviii, 181. $6.50.
One might think, as a first reaction to this book, that there is little room for
yet another general work on African law. Already, apart from works by individual authors such as Elias, ' there is the symposium edited by the Kupers,2 there
are the reports of the 1964 Ibadan conference and the 1966 Addis Ababa seminar
on African law, and several other works of a collective nature are soon to be
published. Apart from anything else, one might not too seriously reflect, authors
will soon run out of suitable titles for such works. This reaction would, however,
be unfair. The present collection of essays, originally presented as a special issue
of the Wisconsin Law Review,' will now reach a wider audience. Despite the
breadth of its title, it comprises a series of case studies by different authors of the
evolving law in various English speaking countries of Africa.
The studies vary greatly in length, originality and aim. Thus the interesting
chapter by Dean W. B. Harvey4 is not concerned so much with the general pattern of legal development in Ghana as with the political and constitutional
changes which have directly flowed from the military takeover in February, 1966.
As Harvey observes (and this would be true of all the African coups and secessions), the legal system in Ghana has remained much as it was before the takeover, except for the obvious changes that had to be made by the National Liberation 5 Council to remove some of the more oppressive aspects of the Nkrumah
regime.

A broader examination of legal development in Ghana is found in S. K. B.
Asante's contribution,' which is in effect a "review-article" devoted to a critical

examination of Professor Harvey's recent book.7 Asante's basic criticism of that
work is, firstly, that a simple explanation of Africa's tangled politico-legal problems is probably misleading." Secondly, the criteria by which Harvey analyzes
the legal order in Ghana are, according to Asante, predetermined instead of
emerging from the local environment.' Asante's essay, however, closes with a

paradox:
In Ghana, a colonial regime imbued with Western individualistic
values did not succeed in effecting a radical change in the basically collec1 T. 0. ELIAS, BRITISH COLONIAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN ENGLISH AND LOCAL LAWS IN BRITISH DEPENDENCIES (1962).
2 H. KUPER & L. KUPER, AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1965).
3 Africa: Legal Aspects of a Developing Society, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 996.
4 Harvey, Post-Nkrumah Ghana: The Legal Profile of a Coup, in AFRICA AND LAW:
DEVELOPING LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH NATIONS 104 (1968) [hereinafter
referred to as AFRICA AND LAW].
5 Id. at 116.

6
7
8

Asante, Law and Society in Ghana, in AFRICA AND LAW 121.
W. B. HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA (1966).
Asante, supra note 6, at 125. The author points out that:
In any particular politico-legal situation in Africa, the forces at play may be so
complex, so multifarious, so fluid, and so encumbered with expedient makeshifts and
compromise as to defy any attractive rationalization in terms of sweeping philosophical

9

Asante makes this observation in the following language:
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the essay on value competition is the

postulates. Id. at 125-26.
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tivistic attitudes of the Ghanaians. The time lag between formal prescriptions and social acceptance of the value underpinnings of these prescriptions
proved an imponderable factor. Likewise, the Nkrumah regime, for all its
loud advocacy of Eastern socialist values, hardly changed the solid attitudes
instilled by a hundred years of contact with the British.10
What remains obscure from Asante's analysis is the connection between these
two assertions. Apparently British contact did after all instill certain attitudes and
modes of behavior in Ghanaians. Quite what these are, and what have been
the respective contributions of British Victorian private enterprise and modem
welfare state notions, of traditional African institutions and of the imperatives
of the centrally organized, politicized state to the evolution of Ghanaian law,
are questions that still await treatment in a full-scale study.
Professor R. B. Seidman's much longer contribution11 goes some way in answering these questions. Despite the omnibus title, many of the illustrations and
arguments in Seidman's essay are derived from Ghana, and some of his generalizations apply imperfectly, if at all, to other parts of the continent.
Broadly, Seidman sees law as going through three stages or phases, each of
which corresponds to a different level of economic and political evolution. The
basis of legal obligation, he argues, has moved from Status to Contract to Plan.
These correspond to the "subsistence pre-capitalist," so-called "capitalist," and
so-called "socialist" modes of economic organization. Maine and his celebrated
dictum about the movement from Status to Contractf 2 is invoked in support of
the first part of this analysis; Marxist thinking and categories are extensively relied
on for the second part.
The British in Africa, according to Seidman, found society at the subsistence
stage, ruled by status and customary law. They imposed the second of the three
stages-the nineteenth century private enterprise system and the nineteenth century English law that went with it. Whatever the rights or wrongs, African states,
because they are now developing, must now move into the third phase-that of
the plan and the sort of administrative law that goes with it.
Every attempt made by a Descartes, a Marx or a Maine to simplify the bewildering complexity of world history and reduce it to tidy simplicity has attractions; but Asante's criticism of Harvey is equally valid when applied to Seidman's
more ambitious analysis. The acceptability of Seidman's position depends
on the accuracy of a large number of factual assertions, and on the assessment, necessarily more tentative and more colored by the preconceived
inadequacy of the criteria used. Instead of delving into the political and legal order
of Ghana to discover the peculiarly Ghanaian sources of political and legal determinants, Professor Harvey came to Ghana with the legal philosopher's armory of
predetermined value criteria and sought to verify them by reference to local experience. This exercise is unobjectionable in itself, but, by purging -these criteria of
local content, Professor Harvey is compelled to rely on high-level abstractions that
are patently inadequate for unraveling the full depth of Ghanaian value acceptance.
Id. at 127.
10
11

Id. at 132.
Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking, SubSaharan Africa, in AFRICA AND LAW 3.
12 H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (10th ed. 1920). "[T]he movement of progressive societies

has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." Id. at 174.
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positions and responses of each analyst, of the benefits and disadvantages of the
policies and practices enforced at different points in Africa's history.
Let us begin with Maine's dictum. Citation of this dictum can, of course,
prove nothing about African legal evolution. Rather it is the other way around:
How far does the content of African customary laws validate or invalidate this
dictum in its application to Africa? A philosophical as well as a historical point
is involved here. Firstly, it is by no means true that all African legal relationships
derived from status obligations. The scope given to voluntary act and the creation
of obligations by agreement has been consistently and seriously underestimated.
Secondly, one may argue that every particular legal relationship falls within a
given class of model legal relationships, the participants in which occupy legal
roles, again of a defined class. This is true as much of contract relations as it is of
so-called status relations. However, a unique, singular, legal relationship is, under
this view, a logical impossibility, since law is characterized by its recognition of
generalized classes or types of role and institution.
Seidman's schema demands not only that customary law should in its traditional form be allocated to the status-inspired group of laws, but that it was and
remains linked to a subsistence economy. He seems to give too little credit to the
capacity of customary law to adapt to new economic conditions. For instance,
both in East and West Africa, one is impressed by the way that traditional land
laws accommodated the notion of economic agriculture--of crops cultivated for
the market rather than for personal consumption. The buildup of the cocoa,
ground-nuts, palm oil, cotton and coffee industries would have been impossible
without this accommodation.
This emergence of a developed customary land law makes it difficult to accept Seidman's strictures."3 That author quotes, apparently with approval, a dictum of Clauson to the effect that shifting agriculture inevitably results in "soilmining." 4 On the contrary, modern agronomic opinion is moving steadily to the
view that shifting agriculture is a sensible and effective way of conserving the longterm fertility of the soil. It is only with the cessation of shifting agriculture or the
shortening of the period of fallow that the soil is being worked out. Agriculturalists, let us not forget, are equally concerned with the possibility of soil exhaustion
in the intensive agriculture of highly developed western countries.
The following comments on Seidman's article are of varying degrees of
significance.
(1) The "extended family," says Seidman, loses its raison d'gtre in a cashbased (as opposed to a subsistence-based) economy.' 5 This observation illustrates
a pervading tendency in Seidman's essay to see human and developmental problems in purely economic terms. The unfortunate results of this theory are that
Law's success is measured by the extent to which it promotes economic activity,
and the social consequences of any given legal institution tend to be overlooked,
or their importance understated. In this instance, the raison d'9tre (or raisons)
of the complex household system in traditional society extends far beyond the
13 See Seidman, supra note 11, at 48-55.
14 Id. at 49n.180.
15 Id. at 6.
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economic. Mutual assistance in legal and social, as well as productive, activities is
one reason for this existence, but in truth there is a whole spectrum of religious,

psychological and ideological motivations for the growth and retention of the family system. (One might incidentally observe that modem Western and Soviet societies emphasize the. basic need for an extended family system, the lack of which
today lies at the root of so many social problems, such as care of the aged, protection for infants, custody of the mentally ill.)
(2) Although it is quite true that commercial activity in some areas of
Africa was largely extractive, it is not fair to say, as Seidman does, that "[t]he
subsistence economy droned on, not significantly improving from year to year and
leaving its inhabitants drowned in perpetual penury, disease, and-in terms of
modem technology-ignorance.""6 Such a statement displays a certain tendentiousness or black-and-white approach to African history, and ignores entirely the
heroic and often unappreciated efforts of agricultural officers, experimental stations, schools, hospitals and clinics to rectify these disabilities. The whole infrastructure of the contemporary African states-roads, railways, schools, administrative machinery, and so on-was built up in colonial times. Undoubtedly,
more could have been done-but of how many human enterprises is this not true?
(3) In Professor Seidman's summary discussion of the application of criminal law in British Africa, there are several points which require explanation or
correction. English criminal law was being applied in the Gold Coast settlements
before the enactment of the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1853. Seidman says:
"The Indian Penal Code was introduced in East Africa early in the century
[presumably, from the context, the twentieth century]."'" The Indian Penal Code
was in fact introduced into Zanzibar in 1867. In the Uganda Protectorate it was
in force by the end of the nineteenth century. In the East Africa Protectorate the
Indian Penal Code was introduced in 1897. The Sudanese Penal Code (not
Criminal Code) was modeled on the Indian Code, not the identical Pakistan
Code, which naturally was not in existence at that time. Seidman's statement that
"[d]uring the 1930's the colonial office drafted a new criminal code based in
large part upon the Queensland Code,""8 which was then introduced in East and
Central Africa, is misleading, since this new code was already in operation in the
countries mentioned by 1930. Finally, Seidman objects that the codes and the
mores of the peoples subject to them were far apart; but this criticism appears to
adopt the volksgeist approach to law that Seidman later criticizes the present
reviewer for using, and ignores the role of law as command which the legislator
can use to establish new patterns of behavior.
(4) "The prevailing political pattern in Africa at independence was a variety of the Westminster model." 9 This statement is true only if restricted to the
Commonwealth African states and provided that one recognizes the very large
differences between the African constitutions, which are written, have express
distribution of powers, entrenchment of fundamental rights and judicial service
commissions, and that of the United Kingdom. However, Seidman rightly draws
16
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attention to the very few restraints upon the power of the executive in African
states, due to the absence of societies and associations, the weakness of trade
unions, and the feebleness of the press.2" He also correctly draws attention to the
fact that the judiciary in Africa has sometimes proved a broken reed,2 although
the instances he cites would not seem to be the best ones for the proof of this
thesis. In Ghana, the judiciary did well until recent times in its attempts to mitigate some of the more unfortunate and unjust consequences of Nkrumahist legislation, and its efforts led to its eventual removal. In Nigeria the decision in Adeg2
benro v. Akintola"
does not illustrate, as is maintained by Professor Seidman, the
thesis that the African judiciary has been weak in restraining arbitrary actions by
the executive, but rather shows the impossibility of relying on extraneous courts in
acute political and constitutional controversies. Seidman also draws attention to
the prevalence of corruption, which is eating into the body politic.22 What is saddening to see is that corruption, defined broadly to include not only the misuse of
power for financial gain but also any wilful perversion of the proper course of
administration of justice for personal motives, is as widespread in the so-called
"socialist" states of Africa as it is in those which are frandy private enterprise.
(5) In discussing the adequacy of customary law for the modem needs of
African states,24 Seidman begins with a quotation from an article which I wrote
several years ago, in which, inter alia, I suggested that the legislator should pay attention to customary law as an expression of the way of life and the ethos of a people.25 Both one's thought and the legal necessities of Africa can develop, of course,
but the criticisms which Seidman makes of this observation are, I respectfully
submit, based on a certain lack of perception and on overstatement of what are
truly the weaknesses of customary law. Seidman denies that customary law can
reflect "the people's own choice of legal system," 26 arguing that the law must be
filtered through the courts and that the judges influence the choice of which laws
are recognized and which are not. He further draws attention to the repugnancy
clauses, which in the past have disallowed customary law that is "repugnant to
justice, equity and good conscience," 27 to the fact that customary law must not be
incompatible with any written law, and to the fact that the judge must take
judicial notice of customs already approved in earlier cases. He concludes: "As
a result, the law announced by the courts may reflect the ethos of the judges; it
reflects only accidentally, if at all, the common consciousness of the tribes."28
This analysis assumes that an investigation of the forms and inspirations
of customary law must be confined to the rulings of the appellate courts. If an
investigator is concerned with discovering how the ordinary people see the justice of any given conflict situation, or the kind of institution that they would like
to govern their married life or their exploitation of land, he would not dream of
20
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confining himself to the law reports. In East-Africa these reports would contain
practically no decisions on customary law, so that the observations of Seidnan
just cited would certainly not apply there. But even in the coastal areas of
West Africa the investigator would look first at the day-to-day practices of the
people, and at the judgments of their native and local courts and the decisions
made in their extra-judicial arbitrations. This is where the authentic voice of
the customary law is most certain to be heard. There are, it is true, inadequacies in the judicial determination of customary law in the appellate courts,
and the present reviewer, among others, has drawn attention to judicial perversions of customary law that have been perpetrated in the past; but no one could
argue convincingly that appellate court decisions on customary law reflect accidentally, if at all, the customary law as actually observed. The success rate is
clearly better than that. Undoubtedly, too, appellate court judges have to make
normative choices between rules from time to time; but the researcher wishing
to determine how the people really think can easily penetrate behind such choices.
Seidman discusses at the same point the problem of the diversity of customary laws, a problem which presents an obstacle to the legislator who is trying to build a unified national law. One legislative solution in such circumstances is to codify only those principles which seem to be of general acceptance
in all the customary laws within the territory, leaving variations of detail in
force in each community or region. If one seeks a single exclusive law, however,
some violence must inevitably be done to the details of particular legal systems.
Admittedly, this violence may be gross, as where matrilineal people are forced
to adopt a patrilineal scheme of succession. But to assert that an attempt to
synthesize and build on existing customary laws "reflects nobody's Volksgeist,
except'perhaps the compiler's"' 9 seems to overstate the case.
Elsewhere, Seidman argues that the reception of English law and the
rapid changes which have taken place in customary law in recent times in any
event invalidate reliance on the customary law: "To say that the customary law
today still embodies the Volksgeist - if it ever did - is to rest on a mystical
faith, not fact."3 Here the reviewer must confess his bewilderment. It is precisely the capability of customary law to adapt to new economic situations, and
to incorporate ideas originally derived from alien systems, which illustrates and
supports the contention that customary law, being a people's law, expresses
more clearly their contemporary needs and aspirations. Had customary law
remained frozen in its pre-colonial position, then Seidman's dictum might have
had some validity.
The truth of the matter seems to be that there is a basic cleavage of philosophical viewpoint between those who wish to work from below and those
who wish to work from above - the populist and elitist views of life respectively.
In contemporary Africa the elitists and centralists are in control. To them law
is what is imposed from above in the pursuit of imperatives beyond the comprehension of the ordinary citizen. In such circumstances, public opinion and
the repercussions of new laws on the individual are ignored. As Seidman puts
29
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it, one must look outside customary law for the basis of new African legal systems because "customary law simply contains insufficient responses to the demands of development." 1 It goes without saying that customary law in its
original form contains no rules to deal with stock exchanges, large-scale industry,
labor law and the whole apparatus of the welfare state. No one is arguing that
one should draw on customary law in these domains, except in the broadest
possible sense of trying to utilize some of the basic principles and postulates to
inspire or shape the new governmental and economic institutions. This is what
President Nyerere is doing in Tanzania; having come to the conclusion that
the basic informing principle of African customary institutions was ujamaabrotherhood, the family feeling-he is trying to build up modem institutions

in Tanzania in line with this principle. One cannot really expect customary
law to contribute more than that in this field of law and administration. In
this area of debate, therefore, one must concur with Seidman, provided that
one is prepared to distinguish sharply between this part of the law and those
parts where African notions have a more direct and living relevance- marriage, the family, property and contract nexus, succession and family law generally.
(6) In considering the application of commercial law in former British
Africa, Seidman observes that: "The problem is especially complicated because
one cannot predict beforehand which jurisdiction's common law will be applied

in any particular instance." 2 In support of this he mentions the fact that the
Ghana Interpretation Act of 1960 allows a court in Ghana to refer to any exposition of the common law by any court exercising jurisdiction in any country.
There are two comments that one can offer here. The first is that this rule is
uniquely confined to Ghana; in other common law jurisdictions in Africa, the
legislation still makes dear that the law of England has been received and is
being applied, except in so far as it has been replaced by local legislation. If
one looks at the law of contract, for instance, the legislation in Kenya and Uganda
makes it quite clear that it is the law of England which has been adopted. Secondly, even in Ghana the practice of the courts has been to treat the law received as that derived from England; reference to other jurisdictions has been
limited and mainly by way of illustration or qualification only. In following this
practice, the Ghana courts have behaved in no more unpredictable a fashion
than those of England, whose judges today are quite prepared to look at Australian, Canadian or American decisions if they find them pertinent. One can-

not therefore accept Seidman's conclusion that "the applicable law is extremely
hypothetical"T3 ; legal experience inside and outside the courts does not support
this view. This means that one of the major arguments that Seidman puts for-

ward for the codification of the commercial law goes by the board, or rather,
has no greater justification in Africa than it would in England or other jurisdictions where the matter is now under consideration.

(7) Seidman does offer some interesting and valuable comments on the
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public corporations which have been one of the main chosen instruments for
implementing public enterprise in tropical Africa. The disadvantages of the
public corporation, to which he draws attention, have been more conspicuous
than its advantages; the main problems have been those of jobs for the "boys,"
lack of financial accountability, profitability and ministerial control. He draws
attention to the absence of the test of profit-making as a simple standard against
which to measure the performance of the manager of a state enterprise."4 In this
connection, one might draw attention to the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation Decree of 1967, which has been designed to allow the Industrial Holding
Corporation to take over and reorganize public enterprises in an efficient and
profitable manner. In part, Paragraph 9 of that Decree provides:
It shall be the duty of the Corporation to conduct its affairs on sound
commercial lines, and in particular, so to carry out its functions under this
Decree as to ensure that its revenues are sufficient to produce on the fair
value of its assets, a reasonable return measured by taking its net operating
income as a percentage of the fair value of its fixed assets in operation
plus an appropriate allowance for its working capital.

(8) Many of Seidman's comments on constitutional arrangements in
the new states are highly pertinent. Constitutions should, he argues, be concerned
with the problems of African governments, and not those of England in the
nineteenth century.3 " There is the problem of the maintenance of legality, and
the problem of providing an alternative for the incumbent government in countries where opposition is viewed as little short of treason. In the perspective of
the wave of military coups that have overtaken African countries, one can see
that the failure to provide a peaceful way of changing rulers who have fallen
short of the expectations of the people inevitably provokes recourse to violence
and to the intensification of the social and administrative problems which African
countries must face.
As can be seen, Seidman's contribution, even if one does not at all points
agree with the underlying philosophy or the presentation of detail, is a stimulating and humanist attempt at a synthetic approach to African law, viewed not
as the monopoly instrument of professional lawyers, but as a tool for the creation of a more acceptable social order.
Miss Ann P. Munro contributes an interesting analysis of Land Law in
Kenya, 8 which is mainly an evaluation of the land consolidation program and
of the possibilities for the Kenya government to pursue its avowed aim of
"African socialism." There are only two points which warrant elaboration or
criticism in Miss Munro's generally very fair and comprehensive survey.
(1) The author refers to "settlers" as having a separate system of courts3";

this is an unfortunate variation of the legislative language which referred to
natives and non-natives or Africans and non-Africans. Although it is true that
Africans had a separate system of courts, it is not true that there was also a
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system for non-Africans; the latter made use of the general-law courts.
(2) One must be very sympathetic to Miss Munro's criticism of those who
thought that customary land law was static and incapable of evolution. 8 The
most important development in this respect was the evolution of alienable individual interests. Also valuable is her criticism of the conclusions of the 1960
conference on the future of law in Africa, held in London, which rejected customary law as the basis of a modem land tenure system. 9 She comments:
Implicit in this argument is the view that private ownership is more
efficient than customary tenure in attaining the goal of intensive economic
development. The cost in terms of the social disorientation of the peasants
is ignored .... 40
Apart from some general observations about the role of law as an instrument of political and social change, Miss Munro in an appendix recapitulates
the judicial system of Kenya. It is worth noting that the 1967 legislation, the
Judicature Act and the Magistrates' Courts Act, has radically altered the
existing structure, at least in theory. One may also note that the restatements
of customary marriage and succession law in Kenya, referred to by Miss Munro
in a further appendix, are due to appear shortly under the imprint of Messrs.
Sweet and Maxwell.
The other major contribution to the volume is by Cliff Thompson; his
essay is entitled The Sources of Law in the New Nations of Africa: A Case Study
from the Republic of the Sudan.4 One may doubt the propriety of including a
chapter on the Sudan in a volume devoted to the Commonwealth in
Africa since the Sudan is not a Commonwealth nation. Further, the
structure of the Sudanese legal system is entirely different from that which prevailed
in the territories under the administration of the British colonial office. English law
was not introduced to the Sudan overtly and expressly, but by a sidewind under
the general rubric of "justice, equity and good conscience." The important role
of Islamic law in that country, and the consequent parallelism in the court
system, are also without their equivalents further south. Not only does Thompson very usefully review the formal sources of the law and the materials available for their investigation, but he appends a discussion of the key issues for the
future development of law in the Sudan. Among those he mentions are whether
the Shari'a and civil court systems should be merged; what part if any customary
laws should play in the legal system; the demands of economic development;
the influence of Egypt and its legal ideas; and the attempt to build a unified,
codified law in the Sudan. Thompson's remarks on these topics are as perceptive and as constructive as might be expected from one who has contributed so
much to uncovering the sources and problems of Sudanese law. By way of
addendum, one might draw attention to the newly drafted permanent Constitution for the Sudan, which appears to change the legal system in certain funda38
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mental respects. The Constitution states that Sudan is an Islamic country, and
the existing division of the judiciary into civil and Islamic sections will be preserved. Any wholesale unification is obviously postponed for the present.
Lastly (and one hopes not too perversely) we come to the Introduction,
which is contributed by Professor A. Arthur Schiller. Professor Schiller reviews the
justification for the expression "African law," and then considers what place,
if any, customary law may occupy in the legal systems of Africa. Most usefully,
he draws attention to thought and practice in the French-oriented as well as
the English-oriented states.
There are a large number of points, both for approval and disagreement,
in this meaty and controversial survey. However one may disagree on a detail
or an approach here and there, one cannot but welcome this conscientious attempt
to examine realistically the framework within which the law is operating in
Africa.
A. N. Allott*

* Professor of African Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London;
Managing Editor, JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW.
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